ICE Expands Stingray Use As AI Policing Stumbles And Global Surveillance Grows

ICE continues to deploy Stingray cell-site simulators, backed by new contracts and mobile platforms, using one in Utah to precisely locate an escaped Venezuelan prisoner. Meanwhile, San Mateo County’s $12 million C3 AI policing system has reportedly struggled to deliver, even as agencies like ICE invest further in tools such as Clearview AI. Signal rolled out encrypted backups, and Amnesty flagged Pakistan’s expansive surveillance, highlighting a widening gap between surveillance power and privacy protections.

Key Points

• ICE is actively using and expanding cell-site simulator (Stingray) deployments, supported by new contracts and mobile platforms, to pinpoint targets beyond standard phone location data.
• A recent, unsealed warrant reveals ICE sought a Stingray in Utah to locate an escaped Venezuelan prisoner ordered removed from the U.S., highlighting ongoing civil liberties concerns for bystanders.
• San Mateo County’s $12 million C3 AI ‘Sherlock’ platform has so far underperformed according to officers, raising questions about the efficacy of costly AI policing systems.
• ICE signed a nearly $10 million contract with Clearview AI, signaling continued reliance on facial recognition to investigate assaults on ICE officers.
• Signal launched encrypted chat backups requiring a 64-character recovery key, while Amnesty alleges Pakistan runs expansive domestic surveillance using both Chinese and Western technologies.

Sentiment

Mixed but leaning skeptical of ICE/Stingray use, with strong civil-liberties concerns tempered by a significant minority defending targeted, warrant-backed deployments.

In Agreement

• Stingrays are inherently dragnet tools that risk sweeping up bystander data, raising Fourth and First Amendment concerns, especially around protests.
• Warrants can be rubber-stamped and don’t by themselves cure constitutional or civil-liberties issues; transparency and strict limits are needed.
• Evidence from the Washington protest suggests likely IMSI catcher activity and highlights the chilling effect on lawful assembly and association.
• Users should proactively detect and mitigate surveillance (use tools like EFF Rayhunter, disable 2G, consider Faraday bags/airplane mode, practice careful OPSEC).
• Technical realities (IMSI exposure, downgrade attacks, LTE quirks) mean modern networks are not immune, so vigilance remains necessary.

Opposed

• In the Utah case, ICE had warrants and a specific target; using a Stingray to refine a 30-block search is a standard, acceptable investigative step.
• Claims of mass or protest-focused abuse should be backed by concrete, verifiable evidence before condemning lawful use.
• Carriers offer lawful interception interfaces; with judicial oversight, such tools are less troubling than portrayed.
• Protesters need not demand anonymity if they are acting lawfully; fears of government reprisal are overstated relative to targeted criminal investigations.
• Avoiding phones or using burner tactics can create suspicious anomalies; better to be prudent but not engage in ‘movie-plot’ OPSEC.