After the npm Hack: We Need Real Package Management

The author uses a major npm hack to argue for a radical overhaul of JavaScript’s dependency and package distribution model. He proposes a standard library, consolidation of micro-packages, and distro-style practices like curation, signatures, and reproducible builds, and urges broader ecosystems and corporations to invest in real fixes. Yet he predicts none of this will happen and that the industry will settle for superficial measures and remain vulnerable.

Key Points

The npm supply-chain breach exposes deep, long-standing flaws in JavaScript’s dependency and distribution model.
A better future would include a real JavaScript standard library, consolidation of micro-libraries, and a redesigned npm adopting Linux distro practices (curation, signatures, webs of trust, reproducible builds).
Decoupling development from packaging and empowering maintainers to curate trusted collections would reduce attack surface.
Other ecosystems (Cargo, PyPI, RubyGems) face the same risks and should change course preemptively.
The author expects only superficial responses (e.g., mandatory 2FA, token donations) and no meaningful systemic reform.

Sentiment

Neutral. The single comment is factual and informational, pointing to a relevant technical development. It neither strongly endorses nor rejects the article's specific arguments, but rather offers an example of an industry response that could be interpreted within the context of the article's broader predictions.

In Agreement

The discussion implicitly validates the article's foundational premise regarding the severity and ongoing threat of supply chain attacks, as evidenced by the development of new features like `npmMinimumReleaseAge` specifically designed to mitigate them.
The incremental nature of the highlighted solution (new config options) aligns with the author's pessimistic prediction that the industry will opt for pragmatic, less fundamental measures instead of embracing radical systemic changes.